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JURISDICTION OVER CHATTELS THE TITLE TO
WHICH IS EMBODIED IN A DOCUMENT
JUSTIN K. McCARTHY*
T IS THE PURPOSE of this paper to consider some of the con-
flict of laws problems with respect to jurisdiction over chattels
the title to which is embodied in a document. Perhaps it would be
well to delineate at the outset the scope of the examination herein.
I will first consider the present rule concerning jurisdiction over
chattels in general, the history of this rule, and then examine criti-
cally the rule of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws1 con-
cerning jurisdiction over chattels the title to which is emboded in a
document, in the light of the cases and applicable statutes.
Story, in his monumental treatise on Conflict of Laws, in quoting
from certain continental jurists,2 stated that movables have in con-
tempiation of laws no situs, and are attached to the person of the
owner wherever he is; and, being so adherent to his person, they are
governed by the same law which governs his person, that is, by the
law of the place of his domicil. From this came the maxim Mobilia
sequunter personam.3 He asserted that the doctrine had so gen-
eral a sanction among all civilized natons as to be treated as a
part of the jus gentium.4 And yet he realized that this being but a
legal fiction, it would yield whenever it was necessary for the pur-
pose of justice that the actual situs of the thing should be examined.
"A nation, within whose territory any personal property is actually
situate, has an entire dominion over it, while therein, in point of
sovereignty and jurisdiction, as it has over immovable property
situate there. It may regulate its transfer, and subject it to process
and execution, and provide for and control the uses and disposition
SB.A. Lehigh'University (1950), LL.B. Columbia University School of Law (1953),
Member 'of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 50 (1935)
Chattels to the title to which is embodied in a document-
(1 ) To the extent to which title to a chattel is embodied in a document by the
law which governed the chattel at the time the document was issued, title
to the chattel is subject to the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction
over the document as a chattel and such jurisdiction is exclusive except as
stated in Subsection (2)
(2) The state in which the chattel is may enforce
(a) inttrests growing out of acts done in the preservation of the chattel;
(b) interests essential to the exercise of the state's police and taxing
powers;
(c) interests dependent upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
2. Story, Conflict of Laws, See. 377 (2d. ed. 1841).
3. Id. Sec. 378.
4. Id. Sec. 380.
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of it, to the same extent, that it may exert its authority over im-
movable property."5
The concept of documents of title was, by no means, alien to
Story, for he posed the case of a shipment of goods from England
to New Orleans on account and risk of a merchant domiciled in
England, who owes debts in New Orleans, and a subsequent trans-
fer of the bill of lading in England to a purchaser, after their arrival
but before the unloading thereof. He then stated that by the law of
England and many other commercial States, the legal title to the
goods passes by the mere indorsement and delivery of the bill of
lading, without any actual possession of the goods by the purchaser.
If such a title, so acquired, could be divested by the want of a
deliv;ery according to the laws of Louisiana, it would most material-
ly impair the confidence which the commercial world had hitherto
reposed in the universal validity of the title acquired under a bill of
lad'ng.6
Wharton, writing sixty-four years later, rejected the old dis-
tinction between mobilia and immobilia, and further asserted that
the rule fell with the reversal of the conditions from which it
emanatedT Moreover, the policy of sovereignty requires the ap-
plication of the lex rei sitae* with respect to chattels.8
The present conception of jurisdiction over a person or thing is,
in the main, geographical. 9 Like land, chattel is stuated on some
territory and is subject while there to the jurisdiction of the state.10
But jurisdiction over the thing does not necessarily involve jurisdic-
tion over the owner or over his interest in the thing." Typically
the owner has submitted his interest to the jurisdiction of the
state by belonging to or being in the state, or by permitting his
chattel to be there, but Professor Beale goes on to argue that if
the owner has done nothing to submit his interest to the law of the
state where the thing is, there is no jurisdiction in that state to
affect the rights of the absent person. Both Professor Beale and the
American Law Institute use the term "jurisdiction" in a restricted
sense, viz. that the act in question will be given extraterritorial
effect. 2
5. Id. Sec. 550.
6. id. See. 394.
7. Wharton on the Conflict of Laws, See. 297 (3d ed. 1905).
8. Id. Sec. 305.
9. Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1293 (1930).
10. I-Beale, The Conflict of Laws, Sec. 49.1 (1935).
11. Beale, urisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel, 40 Harv. L. Rev.
805, 811 (1927)
12. 1 Beale, See. 50.3.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The question of jurisdiction principally arises in connection with
the taxation of the chattel, with respect to the relation of different
parties, to the chattel, with judicial action over the chattel, with
respect to ownership and the use of it, and with the administration
of the chattel."
The present rule of the Restatement concerning jurisdiction over
tangibles in general is articulated in Sec. 49, and is as follows:
"Except as stated in Sec. 50 which deals with merger of the title
to a chattel in a document, a chattel is subject to the jurisdiction
of the state within which it is."
It is with this exception to the general rule that this paper is
concerned.
The common law considers that, in many cases, a chattel is
capable of being merged in a document issued in connection with
som dealing with the chattel, as where a chattel is entrusted to a
carrier and against it a document is ssued which is negotiable. 4
This is true at common law in the case of a foreign bill of lading,
and under very generally adopted statutes, with an inland bill of
exchange or warehouse receipt. The original draftsmen of the
Restatement cited negotiable bills of lading and warehouse receipts
as illustrations of documents embodying the title of chattels. 1
The modern policy of the law is to cultivate the utmost freedom
of commercial transactions. Bills of lading and other documents
of title perform a special function. They are regarded as so much
cotton, grain or other articles of merchandise, in that they are
symbols of ownership of the goods they cover.1 If a document of
title is the symbol of goods in any real sense it must follow that the
symbol is the exclusive means of dealing with the goods. Delivery
of the symbol cannot amount to a real delivery unless the buyer
can be confident that the symbolic delivery excludes the possi-
bility of other dealings with the goods without his consent.
1
7
The Uniform Sales Act was the first of the uniform statutes to
concern itself with the problems of documents of title. A docu-
ment of title in which it is stated that the goods referred to therein
13. Id. See. 49.1.
14. Id. See. 50.4.
15. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 50.
16. Friedlander v. Texas, etc. By. Co., 130 U.S. 416 (1889).
17. 2 Williston on Sales Sec. 438 (1948).
Citizen's Banking Co. of Eastman v. Peacock, 29 S.E. 752 (1897)-(Action
against warehouseman for the recovery of bales of cotton. Plaintiff nonsuited and
appeals. The warehouse receipts covering the goods in question had been pledged
to plaintiff. Held: that it was the intention of the legislature in passing the statute
in question to make the warehouse receipts stand for the property which they rep-
rtsent. ,Action could be mantained by holder of the receipts quasi-negotiable in
form.)
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will be delivered to the bearer or to the order of any person named
in such a document is a negotiable document of title.1s Several
statutes besides the Sales Act have been widely enacted in recent
years which have for part, at least, of their aim, the object of mak-
ing bills of lading and warehouse receipts negotiable when such
documents are made out to the order of a person named therein.
These statutes are the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uni-
form BilI1 of Lading Act, and the Federal Bills of Lading Act,
commonly known as the Pomerene Act.1° The Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act has now been enacted in every state in the United
States, and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act is law in over half the
States. The Pomerene Act covers all shipments of goods in inter-
state commerce for which a bill of lading has been issued.
Even a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt is not a full substi-
tute for the tangible which it represents. It creates a duty on the
part of the carrier or warehouseman to deliver on presentment of
the paper.20 Its negotiability creates a power to destroy by nego-
tiation the claims of certain individuals to delivery and to convey
to another the right to possession.
Under Sec. 39 of the Sales Act and corresponding sections of
the other uniform acts relating to documents of title,'2 1 a creditor is
unable to attach the goods of his debtor unless he prevents the
possibility of negotiation of the outstanding document of title. This
can only be done by obtaning an injunction against the negotiation
of the document or actually impounding it. The warehouseman or
carrier is under no obligation to deliver up the possession of the
goods until the document is surrendered to him or impounded by
the court.22 The net effect of these sections is that goods for which
a negotiable document of title has been issued are immune from
attachment unless the statutory measures for the protection of the
holder of the goods have been complied with. This result is now
18. Sec. 27 Uniform Sales Act.
19. 39 Stat. 538, 49 U.S.C.A. §§81-124.
20. Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 489
(1953).
21. Sec. 25 Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Sec. 24 Uniform Bills Lading Act.
22. See,e.g., Stamford Rolling Mills Co. v. Erie R. Co., 257 Pa. St. 507, 101 Atl. 323
(1917)-(Stamford Co., a Del. corp., issued a writ of foreign attachment against J. Lipton
d.b.a. Acme Iron & Steel Co. as Defendant and Erie R. Co. as garnishee. The Acme Co.
shipped from Cleveland a cargo of scrap consigned to its order in Conn. The HR had
delivered to the qhipper an order bill of lading for the contents of the car. The ct. below
dissolved the attachment on the ground that the bill of lading was negotiable and as the
bill had not been surrendered or its negotiation enjoined the goods could not be attached.
Aff'd. Sec. 24 U. B. L. A.)
Cf. Note, 7 N. Car. L. Rev. 294 (1929) Jurisdiction of Persons and Property for Pur-
poses of Attachment.
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clear under the uniform state commercial statutes and under the
Pomerene Act, and cases can now rarely arise that are not governed
by one or another of these statutes.
2 3
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a negotiable document
of title is required to seek such-aid from courts of appropriate juris-
diction by injunction and in attaching such document or in satisfy-
ing claims by means thereof as is allowed in law or equity in re-
gard to property which can not readily be attached or levied upon
by ordinary legal process..2 4 The creditors must come into equity
and prove that the debtor is the owner of negotiable documents of
title2 5
The obvious case where the question of jurisdiction over title to
chattels from a conflict of laws standpoint arises is one wherein the
goods are in State X, the negotiable document of title in State Y, and
possibly, the endorsee or holder of the document is in State Z. Such
a case was squarely presented to the New Jersey Chancery Court in
the case of Brimberg v. Hartenfeld Bag Co. 26 The defendant,
Hartenfeld Bag Co., was a foreign corporation not authorized to
do business in New Jersey. The complainant's bill set forth that he
had caused a writ of attachment to be issued under which the
sheriff took possession of the goods in the hands of the railroad, the
property of the defendant; that the defendant had negotiated an
order bill conveying the goods to one Gesas, a resident of Illinois;
that the bill was in the actual possession of defendant, Steinhaus,
an attorney, resident of New York; that the defendants were about
to move to set aside the execution of the writ of attachment upon
the ground that the defendant railroad was a common carrier and
the goods while in its possession were protected from attachment
by the Act of Congress of 1916, as well as the New Jersey statute.
The complainant further alleged that the defendant Gesas was not
a bona fide holder for value of the bill and that the goods are really
the property of the Hartenfeld Bag Co. and concluded with the
23. 2 Williston Sec. 439.
24. Sec. 40 Sales Act;
Sec. 26 Warehouse Receipts Act;
Sec. 25 Bills of Lading Act;
Sec. 24 Pomerene Act;
Sec. 7-602 Uniform Commercial Code."25. Boston Sheridan Co. v. Sheridan Motor Car Co. et al, 244 Mass. 425, 138 N.E.
806 (1923)-(action by trustee process against the trust co. and Sheridan Co. The trust
co. answered that it had certain bills of lading on certain automobiles. Held: that the trust
co. had no goods, or effectsi of the defendant in its possession that could be attached.
Remedy is to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction and enjoin the negotiation of the
bills.)
26. 89 N.J. Eq. 425, 105 At. 68 (1918).
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prayer that it be so adjudged and the negotiation of the bill en-
joined. The Court dismissed the complainant's order to show cause,
and held that the purpose of the Federal and New Jersey statutes
undoubtedly was to protect goods in transit and in possession of a
carrier against seizure until the carrier should be first liberated from
liability and attack by surrender of the order bill. Such legislation
has made the bill the res rather than the goods.
"The holder of the bill and the bill itself are without the jurisdic-
tion of this court so that this court is without power to effectively
enjoin negotiation. Application for such relief will have to be
made either in the jurisdiction where the bill or the holder is ....
Where, as in this case, the goods are in one state, the order bill
in another, and the alleged holder of the order bill in still another,
it may well be that courts of equity, acting in the three jurisdic-
tions, will simultaneously go so far as each may in protecting the
rights of creditors, although no one court may be able, without
the aid of the others, to make a decree which will be effective as
against all parties."
27
The court concluded that ample opportunity had been given to
the complainants to institute proceedings in either the jurisdiction
where the alleged holder of the order bill was, or the bill itself, and
no such proceedings had been instituted.
Service of attachment on the holder of the document does not
comply with the statutes. The act requires a bill in equity and the
taking of every essential step as provided for in chancery pro-
ceedings.
2
It has been suggested that the preemption of the field of regula-
tion of title interests in chattels in interstate commerce by Congress
hag made the question one of federal law in which no interstate
conflicts can exist.2 0 There are some slight differences from state
to state in the wording of some of the provisions of the uniform
commercial statutes, but in the main the provisions as to negoti-
ability and effect of negotiation are the same. Consequently, Pro-
fessor Stumberg suggests, interstate questions of conflict of laws do
not frequently arise. 0
27. Id. at 69.
28. Pottash v. Albany Oil Co., 274 Pa. 384, 118 AtI. 317 (noted in 8 Corn. L.Q. 176)
-(plaintiffs issued foreign attachment under which the shf. seized several carloads of
goods being transported by Pa. RR under a negotiable bill of lading which was in pos-
session of bank. The RR and the bank were both served with copies of the attachment,
and duly appeared in the action. Rule to show cause why the attachment should not be
dissolved for non-compliance with Sec. 24 UBLA made absolute. Aff'd. Service of at-
tachment did not "enjoin" the negotiation of the bills.)
29. Note, The Power of the State to Affect Title in a Chattel Atypically Removed to It,
47 Col. L. Rev. 767,774 (1947).
30. Stumberg, supra note 20, at 498.
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It is the writer's conclusion that the rule enunciated n Subsection
(1) of Section 50 of the Restatement is compelled by the cases
where in this problem has been considered and the statutes dis-
cussed herein.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF SUBSECTION (1)
Subsection (2) of Section 50 asserts that the state in which the
chattel is may enforce:
(a) interests growing out of acts done in the preservation of
the chattel;
(b) interests essential to the exercise of the state's police and
taxing powers;
(c) interests dependent upon the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
The general rule with respect to the power to tax is that some
benefit to the property taxed is the controlling consideration." It
is also essential to the validity of a tax that the property be within
the territorial limits of the taxing state.12 Protection and payment
of taxes are said to be correlative obligations."-
In Sellinger v. Kentucky14 the Supreme Court held that the State
of Kentucky could not impose a tax on warehouse receipts held in
Kentucky on whiskey stored in Germany. "The receipts can not
be taken to be more than one of several keys to the goods ....
We take it to be almost undisputed that if the warehouses were in
Kentucky the state would not and could not tax both the whiskey
and the receipts, even when issued in Kentucky form, and that it
would recognize that the only taxable object was the whiskey."
Conversely, a Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Large Dis-
tilling Co."6 held that a Maryland corporation registered to do
business in Pennsylvania was obliged to pay "bonus" on whiskey
31. Union Refigerator Co. v. Kentucky, 197 U.S. 194 (1905)-(Question was
whether a corp. organized under Ky. law could be subjected to taxation upon its tangible
personal property, permanently located in other states, and employed there in the prose-
c'ution of its business. Held: property in question not subject to the taxing power of the
Comm. of Ky.)
32. Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (18 8 8 )-(action brought by
state of Pa. to recover the amount of tax settled by the Aud. Gen. on the defendant's capital
stock using as a basis such proportion of its capital stock as the no. of miles of railroad over
which cars were run by the Defendant in Pa. bore to the total no. of miles owned by D.
Ct. aff'd the tax a- one in substance and effect on the property within the state.)
Cf. Old Dominion SS Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905)-(Va. taxed certain ves-
sels, the property of a Del. corp. but used in Va. coastal waters and harbors. Tax aff'd.)
33. Pullman's Car Co. v. Pa., 197 U.S. at 204.
34. 213 U.S. 200 (1909)
35. Id. at 206.
36. 22 Pa. D. & C. 147 (1937)-(Appellant, a Md. corp., had purchased warehouse
receipts in NYC for the whiskey in quest. stored in a Pa. Warehouse. Held: that the
whiskey was taxable to the appellant, being held under the protection of the laws of Pa.
for the corporate uses of defendant.)
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held in a Pennsylvania warehouse through the medium of ware-
house receipts. The fact that negotiable warehouse recepts have
been issued for the property held in bond does not affect the
question of the power of the state. A state has the undoubted
power to tax private property having a situs within its territorial
limits, and may require the party in possession of the property to
pay the taxes thereon. 7
The general rule is that chattels which are in transit from one
state to apother are not considered as having a situs in every state
through which they pass, so as to subject them to taxation there.",
In McCutcheon v. Board of Equalization39 it was held that Jersey
City could tax flour held on a pier for repacking and blending. The
flour had been shipped from the Northwest to New York City on
through bills of lading. The fact that the flour was held for repack-
ing and blending broke the continuity of the journey. Nor does the
fact that goods are stored in a warehouse while waiting for ship-
ping facilities to their ultimate destination exempt them from tax-
ation at the situs.1°
Statutory tax liens are generally held to have priority over a
foreign chattel mortgage lien. In First National Bank of Valentine
v. Peterson14 the plaintiff bank advanced a loan on cattle located in
Nebraska, and by the terms of the mortgage to be kept in Ne-
braska. Prior to the execution of the note and mortgage the mort-
gagor had resided in and owned personal property in South Dakota
against which personal property taxes had been levied and not paid
before the removal of that property. Later without the plaintiff's
knowledge the cattle described in the chattel mortgage were in
South Dakota, whereupon the sheriff levied upon and took the
cattle into possession. The plaintiff then commenced this action to
recover possession of the cattle, but the Court in applying the
South Dakota tax statute held that the lien for taxes on he personal
property had priority over the interest of the Nebraska mortgagee.
37. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904).
38. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 154 Neb. 632, 48 N.W. 2d
756 (1951 )-(Plaintiff is a Del. corp. with its principal place of business in Minn. It is
engaged in the buying, selling, storing and cleaning of grain. It had no terminal facilities
in Neb. or grain stored there.)
39. 87 N.J.L. 370, 94 Atl. 310 (1915).
40. John Ross & Co. v. Daviess County, 186 Ky. 589, 217 S.W. 677 (1920)-(Ap-
peal from an assessment for taxation on certain tobacco in question was a resident and
citizen of Engl. The owner had only stored the tobaccp while waiting for shipping facili-
ties to Engl. for icsale. Held: Tax aff'd.)
41. 67 S. Dak. 400, 293 N.W. 530 (1940) Noted in 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 511
(1941)-(wherein the result of this case is compared with Sec. 50 (2) b of Rest. Con-
flict of Laws).
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Where a mechanic's or materialman's lien is expressly given
priority by local statute, the lien is usually held superior to the
foreign owner's interest because of the value added to the chattel.
42
The police power prevents the use of one's property in his own
way as against the general comfort and protection of the public.
The power of eminent domain deprives the owner of property of
the ability to obstruct the public necessity and convenience by ob-
stinately refusing to part with his property when needed for publfc
use Both of these powers are inherent in the concept of sov-
ereignty.
Typically a proceeding to forfeit a chattel for its use in an
illegal enterprise is a proceeding in rem-the chattel itself is con-
sidered the wrongdoer. It has been suggested that a better practice,
and one more in accord with due process, would be a proceeding
in which the true owner could appear and present his claim of
ownership. 43 But this has not been the practice of the cases.
4
In conclusion, the rule of Subsection (2) of Section 50 of the
Restatement is substantiated by the cases. The state's power to
tax chattels having a situs within its borders is undisputed. The
power of eminent '4.omain and the police power are equally as
broad and undisputed. The writer's research has dsclosed no case
in which a state exercised the power of eminent domain over a
chattel the title to which was- embodied in a document, but it seems
apparent that the state in which the chattel is could exercise such
power. Generally, states in which the chattel is situate have en,
forced interests growing out of acts done in the preservation of the
chattel, and in adding value to the chattel.
42. Willys Overland Co. v. Evans, 104 Kans. 632, 180 Pac. 235, (1919) (Plaintiff
appealed from a judgment which preferred the lien of a repair bill to its chattel mtge. on
the automobile in question. The mtge. was filed and recorded in Mo. The car was brought
to a Kans. garage for repair without plaintiff's knowledge. Ct. applied the Kans. statute
which gave the garageman a prior lien.);
Cf. C.I.T. Corp. v. Jorgonson, 242 N.W. 594 (S.D, 1932) (wherein the ct. found
that the condiiional vendor (in Ind.) had recorded his contract in time to defeat priority
of garageman's lien).
43. Note, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1921).
44. See e.g., State v. Morris, 124 Kans. 143, 257 Pac. 731 (1927) (A proceeding to
forfeit an auto used in transporting liquor. Jdg. of forfeiture rendered, and mtgee. of the
automobile appealed. The car had been purchased in Mo. and the mtge. provided that
it should not be removed therefrom or used for illegal purposes. Aff'd);
Buchholz v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 794, 102 S.E. 760 (1920) (the owner's chauf-
feur took the car into Va. from D.C. where it was- seized. Held: the chauffeur operated
.the car with the permission of the owner and there was no error in declaring a forfeiture.
A very unwise result).
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